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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST H. DEAN, et al., 
Respondents, 
Case No- 14518 
vs. 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, et al., 
Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COME NOW the plaintiffs and respectfully petition this 
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled case. 
This Petition is based on the following grounds. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT OF PRIOR APPROVAL ON PROPOSE^ 
EXPENDITURES. 
In its decision of October 21, 1976, this Court found against 
plaintiffs and in favor of defendants apparently on the basis that 
Subsection (3) of Section 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, purports to exempt 
members of the legislature from submitting the claims in question 
to the Board of Examiners and, therefore, that it is in conflict 
with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution of Utah and thus 
is invalid to that extent. This determination, in effect, broadens 
the power of the Board of Examiners beyond any powers granted by the 
Constitution. If this decision stands uncorrected, the Board of 
Examiners will henceforth have the power of prior approval of any 
proposed budgetary expenditures in addition to its right to 
approve claims, both liquidated and unliquidated. Such prior approval 
powers were nowhere given in the Constitution to the Board of 
Examiners. In fact, the only existing power of prior approval in 
the Board of Examiners was granted by the Legislature itself in Section 
63-2-15(3), U.C.A. 1953, passed in 1941. Absent that statute, the 
Board has only the "... power to examine all claims against the 
State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law. . .", 
Section 13, Article VII. This new power was granted, rather, under 
the additional provision of that Section which provides, "and 
perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law." 
Admittedly this Court has laid to rest any issue of its 
determination that the Board of Examiners can pass upon unliquidated 
claims (those claims made in the absence of any legislative 
appropriation or which are provided for by law but carry no means 
for settlement) and liquidated claims (private claims against appro-
priated funds and agency claims against state appropriations). 
In the case at bar, however, the Court is confronted with 
neither a "liquidated" nor an "unliquidated" claim but, rather, a 
proposed budgetary expenditure. As the Court noted in its decision of 
October 21, 1976, after the travel had been completed, the actual 
and necessary expenditure receipts were properly submitted to the 
Board and were refused solely due to the fact that, prior to incurring 
the expenditures and, therefore, prior to having obtained a claim 
against the State, plaintiffs failed to submit these proposed budgetary 
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expenditures to the Board of Examiners for its prior approval. 
No claim whatsoever by defendants is made that the travel was 
not necessary and appropriate or that the expenses were not actual and 
necessary. Both of these items were stipulated by the parties at the 
District Court level. The only basis for not allowing these claims, 
therefore, was the failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the general 
provisions of Section 63-2-15(3), which by itls own terms specifically 
excluded plaintiffs from such requirement. Tlhe Court, in finding that 
the Board of Examiners properly refused payment, have created a new 
area of power in the Board which was never intended by the founding 
fathers. 
To better understand the import of such a determination by this 
Court, the historical development of the Board should be examined. 
The Constitutional provision originally creating a Board of 
Examiners with power to examine all claims was, and still remains, 
somewhat ambiguous since it does not define the terms "examine11 or 
"claim". However, the 1896 Legislature attempted to outline the powers 
and duties of the Board and establish such procedure. With the passage 
of Chapter 35, Laws of Utah 1896, the Legislature established the Board's 
duties as including the following, insofar as applicable to this matter: 
"7. The Board shall receive claims for which an 
appropriation exists and when apprbved, transmit 
same to auditor for payment. 
8. The Board shall receive claims for which n£ 
appropriation is made, the settlement of which is 
provided by law, and transmit same to the Legislature 
with a statement of approval. 
9. Any claim, the settlement of which is not 
provided for by law, must be received by the Board; 
and on the first Monday in November preceding the 
meeting of the Legislature, the Board must hold a 
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session for the purpose of examining such claims. 
An abstract of these claims must then be submitted 
to the Legislature." 
The first meeting of the Board of Examiners took place on 
March 7, 1896, three days after the approval of the above legislation. 
During the first two years most of the claims consisted of claims for 
goods and services rendered to the Territorial Government for which 
there was no appropriation, but which were required to be paid by law. 
Thousands of these types of claims were presented to the new government 
and required the determination of the Board whether the Territorial 
Government would have been obligated. An examination of these 
determinations shows the Board submitting claims to the Legislature 
for payment when no appropriation existed and denying payment of claims 
which they deemed not to be "proper expenditures". See Minutes of the 
Meetings of the State Board of Examiners, pp. 5-8. Claims for returning 
prisoners, claims for bounties, claims for printing notices required by 
law, and similar claims were first examined as part of the necessity 
of clearing up the obligations of the Territorial Government. This 
type of claim continued after statehood and became typical of one type 
of claim the Board of Examiners had to determine, that is, claims for 
any activities or programs the cost of which is not readily ascertainable 
in advance. 
The second type of claims authorized by the 1896 Act, supra, 
were the tort or contract actions wherein the claimant had been injured 
by acts of the State. Originally, due to sovereign immunity, any redress 
had to be on moral, rather than legal, grounds. 
Utah's constitutional and statutory law specifically provides 
for relief from grievances or wrongs committed by the state which, 
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except for sovereign immunity, would result in redress* On these 
items, the Board must first examine the claim and then forward it to 
the Legislature for their action, whether approved of by the Board or 
not. The Legislature must then determine whether or not to 
appropriate the monies therefore. In this area, it appears that the 
Board rejected claims they considered as "damage" claims and not legal 
liabilities against the State. Even though not considered by the 
Board, the Legislature often assumed liability solely as a moral 
obligation. See Minutes of the Meetings, Vol. I, page 155, and Laws 
of Utah 1896, Chapter 87. 
The final category of claims is those claims established for which 
the appropriation has been made. The best example of this type of claim 
is simply an agency demand against appropriated funds. Laws of Utah 1896, 
Chapter 35, Sections 7, 8 and 9 show that this type of claim requires 
that the obligation already exist since it talks in terms of the Board 
endorsing their signatures on the claim and the auditor drawing his 
warrant for the amount approved. The examination of this type of claim, 
at least until 1941, constituted nothing more than an audit prior to 
payment—an approach justified by the fact that the auditor was performing 
the pre-audit and disbursing function. 
It has been argued that the Board has both ministerial and 
discretionary authority and that discretionary powers must include an 
examination of proposed expenditures since, otherwise, it would merely 
duplicate the auditor's duties and functions. However, prior to 1941 
the State auditor was not a post-auditor but, rather, the chief accounting 
officer and disburser of State funds so the ai|idit function was not 
a duplication but an important viable auditing role not encompassed 
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by any other state agency. After all, the Board was originally 
authorized by Laws of Utah 1896, Chapter 35, Sections 20, 21 and 22 
and Chapter 102, to: 
1. Audit the books of the State Auditor. 
2. Hire outside auditors when necessary to 
audit books of all state officers and institutions. 
3. Count the money in the State Treasury each 
quarter without giving prior notice. 
Another factor in the history of the Board which should be 
considered in determining its power is that, from 1896 to 1921, in 
addition to examining claims, it also functioned as a State Board 
of Supplies and Furnishing. Until 1921, the Board of Examiners was 
given the statutory responsibility, as a Board of Supplies and 
Furnishing, to: 
1. Contract for furnishing of all stationery, 
printing, binding, paper, fuel, lights and other 
necessary supplies used by the Legislature and the 
various departments. To receive all bids for same, 
2. Hire all offices for the state; to furnish 
and keep same in repair. 
3. Examine, when necessary, the inventory 
of all supplies and all accounts and vouchers 
for such supplies. 
4. Hire clerical help for the various offices. 
Thus, prior to 1921, the Board of Examiners did exercise 
certain limited control over proposed expenditures but it did so as 
a Board of Supplies and Furnishing, not as a Board of Examiners. 
These additional powers were properly granted to the Board of 
Examiners by statute pursuant to Article VII, Section 13, wherein it 
states that the Board shall "perform such other duties as may be 
prescribed by law." 
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It is interesting to note that the Minuses of.the Meetings of 
the State Board of Examiners does not list requests for clerical help or 
requisitions for supplies as being claims. They were, however, listed 
as claims when an account had been submitted for payment of goods 
received or services rendered. At this point, the claim was numbered 
and audited and an abstract of the claim made upon the Minutes of 
the Meetings of the State Board of Examiners. (See Volumes I and II.) 
Until 1903 each claim was numbered and individually entered upon the 
Minutes. While the Minutes noted certain requests to hire clerical 
help and purchase certain supplies, they were not listed as claims 
but as requests to the Board of Supplies and Furnishing. 
It should be noted further that not all purchases were made by 
the Board of Supplies and Furnishing—only common supplies and 
the hiring of clerical help. In the case of outside purchases, the 
Board of Examiners had no knowledge of the proposed expenditure until 
a claim was submitted to the Board in the fori^ i of an account. Occasionally, 
one will note upon reading the Minutes of the Meetings of the State 
Board of Examiners that the Board rejected certain claims because the 
agency incurring the obligation had not yet verified the expenditure. 
From 1896 to 1921 major control over proposed expenditures rested with 
the individual agencies. 
Then, in 1921, the governor placed a comprehensive state 
reorganization plan before the Legislature seeking to strengthen 
administrative management by placing responsibility for all fiscal 
affairs in the hands of the governor. A Department of Finance and 
Purchase resulted which was headed by a director appointed by, and 
responsible to, the governor. All of the powelrs and duties of the 
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Board of Supplies and Furnishing were transferred to this new department 
which was to be a central purchasing office and budget management 
department which had powers to: 
1. Establish a uniform system of accounting. 
2. Standardize all salaries for clerical and 
stenographic help. 
3. Establish minimum work hours and related 
personnel policies. 
4. Examine all requisitions and proposed 
expenditures of all state agencies. 
5. Contract for all purchases and sell same. 
6. To hire all offices and furnish and keep 
same in repair. 
7. To investigate work arrangements and duplication of 
effort. 
8. To prepare the budget for the governor for 
submission to the Legislature. 
See Laws of Utah 1921, Chapter 127. From that time until 1925, 
this department had exclusive control over all proposed expenditures 
and, for the first time, departments were forced to seek prior approval 
on all purchases, supplies and personal services, and no payment would 
be made by the auditor on any expenditure which did not receive such 
prior approval. The Board of Examiners during this period continued 
to examine claims against the State, but only obligations which had 
been already incurred. The Minutes of the Meetings of the State Board 
of Examiners during this period suggests that the examination was somewhat 
superficial; e.g., "Claims 01484 to 01863 inclusive, received from the 
Department of Finance and Purchase, were approved by the Board and 
forwarded to the State Auditor for payment." Such did not, however, 
inhibit the Board of Examiners from pulling out questionable claims 
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(illegal or improper expenditures) and disallowing the same even though 
the goods and services had been received. (See Minutes, Vol. II.) 
The Legislature apparently became disillusioned with the department 
and, in 1925, refused to appropriate funds for the continued operation 
of the department and its operations ceased soon thereafter. In 1927, 
the Legislature repealed the statutes creating the department and 
created a State Board of Supplies and Purchase, over the veto of the 
governor. The formal title in this new act specifically provided: 
MAn act relating to the civil administration 
of State Government, enlarging the powers of the 
State Board of Examiners; making that board a 
board of supplies and purchase. . ." 
Through this act the powers and authority of the old department of 
finance and purchase, including budget preparation and the authority 
to examine all proposed expenditures, a power not theretofor held by 
the old Board of Supplies and Furnishing nor the old Board of 
Examiners. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to provide 
these powers statutorily. With the enactment of the 1927 act, the 
Board was now responsible for the budget, personnel, all purchases, 
accounting systems, and the examination of all proposed expenditures. 
The Board was authorized to hire an executive secretary to examine 
all proposed expenditures for the Board. The major difference between 
these provisions and the old Department of Finance and Purchase was 
that the Board of Supplies and Purchase acted for the Board of 
Examiners, not for the governor. 
This arrangement was in effect until 1941, the Board of 
Examiners assuming in large measure the role of chief executive, 
exercising control over the preparation of the budget, all proposed 
expenditures, personnel policies, purchasing, and the like. 
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The present Department of Finance was created in 1941. Pursuant 
to that act, the governor was made responsible for the preparation 
and execution of the budget including the examination of all proposed 
expenditures. See Laws of Utah 1941 (First Special Session), Chapter 
10. By that act (Sections 63-2-12 through 63-2-18, Utah Code Annotated 
1953) the Department of Finance was to have powers including: 
1. To prescribe and fix salaries for state officers 
and employees where not fixed by law. 
2. Approve all requests for personnel. 
3. Authorize travel expenses and establish regulations 
governing same. 
4. Purchase all supplies, equipment and services 
for state agencies. 
5. Prepare the biennial budget for the governor. 
6. Miscellaneous other powers. 
Additional strength was added to that department at the Second 
Special Session in 1941. See Laws of Utah 1941 (Second Special 
Session), Chapter 27. Among other changes, that act designated 
the state auditor as a post auditor, authorized the Department of 
Finance to maintain all State accounts, disburse funds, pre-audit 
claims, and establish a uniform system of accounting for State 
agencies. Further, it directed the Department to establish and 
maintain a budget control system, require work programs and approve 
or disapprove of all proposed state expenditures. These powers, then, 
do not differ greatly from those held by the Board of Supplies and 
Purchase. In the case of the Department of Finance, however, the 
governor was made responsible for the preparation and execution of the 
budget, including the examination of all propsed expenditures. There 
is no mention of the Board of Examiners in the law. 
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In view of this history, there can be little question of the 
intent of the 1941 Act. However, in actuality the management of the 
Department of Finance has become very much a part of the activities 
of the Board of Examiners. The Department has in practice been made 
an arm or agent of the Board of Examiners, thus preventing the 
separation of claims examination from the examination of proposed 
expenditures. There is no question that such a separation did exist 
in practice between 1921 and 1927 although in 1927 the Board of 
Examiners was given the additional authority to examine all proposed 
expenditures. 
In 1941, the attorney general issued an opinion stating that the 
examination of proposed expenditures by the Department of Finance 
in no way prohibited the Board of Examiners from examining actual 
claims presented for those expenditures. See Biennial Report of the 
Attorney General, period ending June 30, 1942, page 83. However, on 
June 30, 1941, the attorney general issued a second opinion wherein 
he concluded that a "claim" included eyery type of commitment made 
by the State and payable out of public monies. Biennial Report, pp. 
139-140. The Board of Examiners followed this with a communication 
to the Finance Commission stating, in part: 
"As stated in the Attorney Generalfs opinion of 
August 20, the procedure defined as aforesaid, 
seems adequate to accomplish the objective of our 
Constitutional provision in question. Naturally, 
the Board of Examiners by its order this day made, 
adopting and approving the said procedure, has 
constituted the Commission of Finance its agent, 
but the Board of Examiners is still held responsible 
for the results obtained. In other words, by the 
adoption of the outlined procedure, the Board of 
Examiners, may not evade or pass to the Commission 
of Finance its Constitutional responsibility. The 
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Board of Examiners, must, therefore, reserve 
supervisory control to the end that if, at any 
time, the procedure should prove inadequate to 
properly guard the public expenditures, the 
Board may have an opportunity to correct an 
irregularity found to exist. This, of course, means 
that any time the Board sees fit to question any 
commitment at any state of the procedure, it may do 
so.H See Minutes of the Meetings, Vol. VIII, p. 1085. 
Thus, despite the Legislative attempt to remove powers theretofor 
given by it to the Board of Examiners, the Board took it upon 
itself to determine that it would not release those powers. 
Finally, in 1963, an attempt was made once again by the 
Legislature to emphasize that the Board would not have the power 
to examine proposed budgetary expenditures until they had cleared 
the budgetary machinery and were, in fact, obligations on the part 
of the State. This Act was challenged, however, in Toronto vs. 
Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P 2d 795 (1964). 
In the course of that decision, the Court indicated its feeling 
that the framers of the Constitution had intended to vest in the 
constitutional officers, ". . . more than a mere auditing function, 
that is, power to examine into the adviseability and necessity of any 
disbursement or proposed obligation of the state; and that this has 
the effect of giving examiners general supervisory power over 
expenditures by the state government" and, further, that: 
"It is obvious that if the examiners could 
not examine and pass upon expenditures before 
obligations were incurred, their function as to 
fiscal control would be greatly impaired, if 
not entirely destroyed." 
Similar statements had been made by the Court prior to the 
Toronto decision in Wood vs. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P 2d 516 (1962) 
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and Bateman vs. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P 2d 381 
(1958). 
In setting forth the foregoing history pf the Board!s powers, 
the plaintiffs are by no means unmindful of those decisions and the 
language set forth therein. 
Plaintiffs respectfully contend, however, that the earlier 
decisions of this Court stand in direct contradiction to such 
expansive powers and have never been expressly overruled. In fact, 
the earlier cases would appear to be closer in time to the original 
drafting of the constitutional article and more familiar with the intent 
surrounding it. 
In 1899 in Thoreson vs. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 
60 Pac. 982 (1899), the Legislature made an Appropriation for the 
payment of monies improperly received by the State and directed the 
Board to receive audit and allow just claims for such reimbursement. 
There, as in the case at bar, the appellant admitted the facts 
showing that the claim was a just one; but updn rehearing (21 Utah 187), 
the Board claimed that a claim for payment wa^ not first presented to 
the Board pursuant to Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Court responded to that claim by explaining that 
the respondent: 
"Never had any claim against the territory, and did not 
have any against the state until the passage of Section 
963, Rev. Stat., nor was the state under any, 
except a moral, obligation to pass an act for the 
relief of such persons." 
Therefore, that section of the Utah Constitution had no relevancy. 
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Further, in Bateman, supra, the Court indicated that "claim" 
was used in its broadest connotation susceptible of various meanings and 
then set forth examples as: 
"... ranging from a moral claim; or the seeking 
of legislative largesse; or asserting a privilege; 
to asserting rights to compensation for property 
or materials furnished, or salary for services 
rendered, to the state." 
It should be noted that nowhere in those examples of various 
meanings of "claim" is the concept of approval on proposed expenditures 
set forth. All of the items referred to are actual "claims" 
where a present right or privilege for recompense exists. 
Plaintiffs respectfully contend that the history of the Board 
and this Court's earlier decisions properly indicate that the 
powers of the Board must be deemed limited to the examination of 
actual "claims" against the State rather than all proposed budgetary 
expenditures, notwithstanding the language in Toronto. 
POINT II 
A DETERMINATION OF THIS COURT THAT THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF PRIOR APPROVAL ON PROPOSED EXPENDITURES 
WOULD DESTROY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT. 
As noted in Point I, the history of the Board and the 
language of this Court in its earlier decisions and, particularly, in 
the Thoreson case , supra, indicates that the Board of 
Examiners' constitutional power was limited to actual existing 
claims against the State and any power of approval of proposed 
budgetary expenditures existed in the Board only as temporarily 
granted by the Legislature, It will be noted that such grants of 
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power, like in Section 63-2-15, have generally excluded control 
over the Legislature. This has not been simply due to jealousy of the 
legislative power. It is simply that such power cannot be logically 
applied to the Legislative Branch. This Court's apparent determination 
that the Board of Examiners now has the constitutional power of prior 
approval of proposed budgetary expenditures, even over the Legislature, 
demonstrates the crucial problems which result from such an extension. 
Throughout the Constitution and throughput the history of this 
State, there has never been any question but that the Legislature 
has the ultimate control on the "purse strings" of the State and has 
the power to determine what expenditures should be made by way of 
appropriations of proposed expenditures of the various departments 
and agencies of the State. The decisions of jthis Court have hereto-
for engrafted the exception upon that concept that the Board of 
Examiners shall have the power to approve the actual expenditures 
of those appropriations by those agencies. However, if the present 
decis.ion of this Court remains uncorrected, the Legislature is placed 
into a position where it must obtain the approval of the Board of 
Examiners of its budgetary appropriations for the State prior to 
passing the same. Clearly such a situation w£s never intended by 
the founding fathers. Otherwise, why have the governor responsible 
for the preparation of a proposed budget and submission of the same to 
the Legislature? 
Taken one step further, why have a Legislature at all, for what 
use could the Legislature be? All bills proposed in the Legislature 
carry a "fiscal note" which indicates the costs which will result or 
the appropriations which will be required if the bill is passed into 
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law. The language of this Court would seem to indicate that the 
Legislature would henceforth be required to obtain the approval of the 
Board before any such bill could be passed, since the bill would 
constitute a proposed budgetary expenditure. Plaintiffs cannot 
believe that this Court intended, by this decision, to engraft such 
an extension of the power on the Board of Examiners to the 
exclusion of the Legislative purpose. Certainly in view of the 
minimal debate engendered by Article VII, Section 13, at the 
Constitutional Convention, no such radical concept was indicated 
by the founding fathers. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Court is indicating in its present decision that the 
founding fathers intended that the Board of Examiners was to control 
all of the operations of this State to the exclusion of the 
Legislative Branch, then there can be no question but that plaintiffs 
were properly excluded from payment for their out-of-state travel 
and that the Legislature must henceforth submit all proposed 
Legislative enactments to which would result in the expenditures of 
monies to the Board of Examiners for their prior approval before 
enacting such legislation into law. If, on the other hand, the Board 
of Examiners does not have the constitutional power of prior 
approval of proposed expenditures before claims for payment are 
submitted, then there is no basis upon which the reimbursement of 
plaintiffs1 travel expenses were withheld. Plaintiffs1 respectfully 
submit that the power of the Board of Examiners to prior approval of 
proposed expenditures must be deemed to exist only as granted by the 
Legislature itself and not as granted by the Constitution. It is 
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for this reason that plaintiffs seek clarification of the 
pronouncements rendered by this Court and urge reconsideration of 
the Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
Melvin E. Leslie 
General Counsel 
Gary,e^Afki 
Staf£-<oun: 
n 
bunsel 
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